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ABSTRACT
Security is a critical issue in mobile commerce, especially in
mobile database systems since mobile environments are dy-
namic and traditional protection mechanisms do not work
very well in such environments. Mobile database access
usually across multiple service domains, traditional access
mechanisms rely on the concept of starting home location
and cross domain authentication using roaming agreements.
However, the cross domain authentications involve many
complicated authentication activities when the roam path
is long. This limits the future mobile applications.
This paper presents a solution for all kinds of mobile ser-
vices through short message service (SMS) systems and a
ticket-based service access model that allows anonymous ser-
vice usage in mobile applications. A service provider can
avoid roaming to multiple service domains, only contact-
ing the Credential Centre in the model to check a user’s
certification. The user can preserve anonymity and read a
clear record of charges in the Credential Centre at anytime,
and the identity of misbehaving users can be revealed by a
Trusted Centre. Furthermore, the solution has been demon-
strated by the implementation with SMS and RS232.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.4.3 [Informa-
tion Systems Applications]: Communications Applications;
H.3.4 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Systems and
Software
General Terms: Algorithms, Design
Keywords: Mobile commerce, Signature, SMS.
1. INTRODUCTION
The number of mobile phone users are more than two bil-
lion in the world and it is still increasing. Mobile computing
and communication is becoming an important factor in our
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daily life. With wireless computing and communication, se-
curity and privacy issues are more critical [9]. The dynamic
mobile environment is incompatible with static security ser-
vices. From the consumer’s point of view, there is often a
preference for a total solution for all kinds of service, some
degree of anonymity such as no more cross authentification,
and a clear statement of account when shopping over the In-
ternet. There are a number of proposals for mobile systems
[6, 4, 13]. All of them lack some flexibility in security man-
agement. The Global system for mobile communications [6],
for example, provided mechanisms for user authentication as
well as integrity and confidentiality, including protection of
information exchanged between the mobile terminal and the
fixed network. It provided only limited privacy protection
for users by hiding their real identities from eavesdroppers
on the radio interface [7]. Gandon and Sadeh described a
semantic e-wallet [4] which aimed at supporting automated
identification and access of personal resources, each repre-
sented as a semantic web service. A key objective was to
provide a semantic web environment for open access to a
user’s contextual resources, thereby reducing the costs as-
sociated with the development and maintenance of context-
aware applications. However, there are some other issues
and problems which need to be addressed such as Global
solutions, SMS implementation, Clear charging, Trustiness
and Scalability.
In the future, mobile commerce systems should provide to-
tal solutions for all kinds of mobile services, guarantee higher
levels of security than current systems, and implement with
a convenient mobile application such as short message ser-
vice (SMS). This means that, as well as requiring confiden-
tiality and the protection of the integrity of the message
exchanged between the user and the service provider, and
authentication of the user to the service provider, mobile ser-
vice systems should also require authentication of the service
provider to the user and guarantee higher levels of privacy
[10, 12]. Furthermore, clear billing has to be ensured.
In this paper, a new approach to address the above men-
tioned problems is proposed. This approach involves a Trusted
Credential Centre (TCC), a Trusted Authentication and
Registration Centre (TARC) (via UDDI) and a secure ticket
based mechanism for service access. Users and service providers
register with the TARC and are authenticated. Services are
described in the TCC and Service Provider by WSDL [3].
Based on authentication, tickets are issued by the TCC to
the users and transferred using SOAP [1]. Tickets carry au-
thorization information needed for the requested services.
The main idea is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: M-service Model
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, ticket
types for mobile commerce are introduced. The single sig-
nature scheme for ticket group 1 and the multi-signature
scheme for ticket group 2 are discussed insection 3. The sys-
tem implementation demonstration with SMS is described
in section 4 while related work is given in section 5. Finally
the conclusions are in section 6.
2. TICKET TYPES
There are several advantages in using tickets for accessing
services such as flexibility, scalability, privacy and transfer
[2].
Although, in the most specific case, a ticket binds a given
user, a given service, and a given service provider together,
this is not necessarily always the case. Consider, for in-
stance, a bus ticket, which usually does not specify who can
use it (i.e., the user) or a travel card, which may not re-
strict the means of transport (i.e., the service). Based on
this observation, there are eight types of tickets. These are
illustrated in Table 1, where ′Θ′ means that the correspond-
ing entity, user, service provider or service is bound by the
ticket, while ′−′ means that it is not.
Types t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7
user - - - - Θ Θ Θ Θ
provider - - Θ Θ - - Θ Θ
service - Θ - Θ - Θ - Θ
Table 1: Ticket types
As mentioned, tickets t1, t2 and t4 have only one entity
bound and tickets t3, t5, t6 and t7 have two or three entities
bound. The tickets are divided into two groups, one is ticket
group 1 including tickets t1, t2, t4, and another one is ticket
group 2 including t3, t5, t6, t7. That are ticket group 1 =
{t1, t2, t4} and ticket group 2 = {t3, t5, t6, t7}.
In the remaining parts, the way the protocols work for
these two groups are explained. The ticket t0 does not re-
quire discussion since it is a general case of e-payment meth-
ods.
3. ALGORITHMS FOR THE TWO GROUPS
3.1 Single signature scheme for
ticket group 1
This section introduces a single signature scheme for tick-
ets t1, t2, t4. The single signature scheme is introduced then
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Figure 2: Multi-signature scheme for ticket group 2
analysed to show how it works for a ticket. There are
four roles in the single signature scheme, Signer role, Ver-
ifier role, Credential role and Trusted role. Depending on
tickets, the Signer role can be a user, service or service
provider that signs a signature as a ticket. The Verifier role
might be a user or service provider that verifies the sig-
nature of the Signer role. The Credential role in the TCC
issues tickets. It provides information for the Verifier role
to check the signature. Whether the signature is valid or
not depends on the information. The Trusted role in the
TARC is a judge to solve the conflict between users, service
providers and services. This is because only the Trusted role
has the secret key of the system and can trace users and
service providers. Each Signer role has a different but fixed
public key I, which is validated once the Signer role is reg-
istered in the TARC. Ticket t4, for instance, is bound to a
user only. A user can follow this scheme to sign a signature
as a ticket, the service provider verifies it and then sends
some information to the Credential role and asks for pay-
ment. Tickets t1, t2 are similar to ticket t4, the signers are
a service provider and service separately but not a user.
However, this scheme only suits the ticket in ticket group 1.
The problems of tickets t3, t5, t6, t7 can not be solved in the
scheme of this section. A multi - signature scheme to solve
these problems is explained in the next section.
3.2 Multi-signature scheme for
ticket group 2
A multi-signature scheme is described in this section for
tickets t3, t5, t6, t7. The number of signers is not limited to
two or three, but v signers. Then the scheme can also be
used when some services are provided by many providers.
This is, in brief, the process of the multi-signature scheme.
In the system initialization, the Trusted role sends the pri-
vate messages (ri, Si) to the Signer roles with public key IDi
in the group (suppose v Signer roles) when the Signer roles
are set up. The public key IDi is similar to the public
key I from the last section, and only the Trusted role can
trace whose public key is IDi. In the second step, the
Credential role verifies if the data (IDi, ri, Di) sent by the
Signer roles is valid or not. A vector (ID1, ID2, ..., IDv, g1),
as the group public key, is put in the Credential role, then
the group can sign.
In the signature process, the Credential role gets v pairs of
data (ti, Ti) from the Signer roles with identity IDi(1 <=
i <= v). In the next step, the Credential role sends the
signed message (t, T, m) to the user as a ticket. The ticket
is sent to the Verifier and the Verifier role checks if it is true
or not. The Verifier role may not verify if the data g1 in the
TCC is not right, and then the signed message is invalid.
the TCC can revoke the anonymity of the Signer roles if
it contacts to the TARC. In the final step, the Verifier role
sends the new data to update the old data in the TCC and
then the TCC can record it. This process is shown in Figure
2.
Suppose there are v Signer roles U1, U2, ..., Uv in the sig-
nature system to sign a message simultaneously. For tickets
t3, t5, t6, t7, two or three signers are enough. The scheme
can also cope with some cases for example some services pro-
vided by many providers. Ticket t6, for instance, is bound to
the user and the service provider. Then the ticket includes
the agreement between these two components. Only a basic
multi - signature scheme is shown. Signers are changed in
order to suit different kinds of tickets.
4. IMPLEMENTATION WITH SMS
This section presents the implementation of the mobile
service system with SMS and RS232. SMS is a service avail-
able on most digital mobile phones that permits the sending
of short messages between mobile phones, other handheld
devices and even landline telephones. RS232 is a standard
for serial binary data interconnection between a data termi-
nal equipment and a data communication equipment, and it
is commonly used in computer serial ports. Figure 3 shows
the implementation framework.
To get the system working, we need:
1. Windows XP operating system,
2. .Net Framework 1.1 (Minimum),
3. GSM phones with AT+C modem command support,
4. Supporting data cable.
A mobile user (User1, User2, etc) has to register with
the system by sending a message to a mobile phone in My
System in Figure 3 before applying a ticket. The mobile
phone connect to the server through RS232. This is an au-
tomated system, no human interaction is needed. When the
system is set to auto mode the system is ready to send, re-
ceive and process messages accordingly. The user’s public
information (I,D) are in a public directory. For simplicity,
we suppose the system initialization is: p = 11, q = 23 and
n = 253, e = 7, d = 63 such that e ∗ d = 1 (mod 220). Here
220 = (p − 1)(q − 1). For simplicity, we suppose the hash
function is H(x, y) = 3x ∗ 5y.
Let us assume that a user I is I = 25. Randomly selecting
k = 4 then (r, S) = (192, 100) (mod 253), computes D =
163 (mod 253). The Trusted role sends (r, S) = (192, 100)
to the user with I = 25.
Suppose the first time the user needs to sign the message
m1 = 9 which includes the service information, etc. The user
sends (I, r,D) = (25, 192, 163) to the Credential role, the
Credential role verifies whether D = r ∗ Ie or not. (I,D) =
(25, 163) is published by the TCC.
When the user requires a movies ticket, the system creates
a ticket following the signature procedures described in the
previous sections. The Verifier role must get the public pair
(I, D0) = (25, 163) in the TCC when s/he verifies whether
the ticket is available or not. The ticket is unavailable if
the public pair (25, 163) is changed. After the Verifier role
checked the availability of the ticket, he/she sends new data
to the TCC to update (25, 163). The implementation of the
system is shown in Figure 4.
5. RELATED WORK
There is some related work on this topic of mobile commu-
nication security such as [5, 11, 15]. For example, a ticket-
based service access are described by Pratel and Crowcroft
in 1997, and Buttyan and Hubaux in 1999 [8, 2]. In [8],
tickets are prepaid and can only be used with the service
provider that issued them (according to the categorisation
described here, tickets are type t7 and require a special
model). Anonymity can be provided for all services for
which it is deemed appropriate. In [2], tickets are issued by
customer care agents and can not be transferred to others.
This approach only solves the case of ticket t4. These two
methods only solve the particular mobile access problems.
In the proposed ticket-based service access scheme, the
users are anonymous since their private information is not
revealed to service providers and the TCC. It is a global
solution for all kinds of mobile services and the tickets can
be lent to others, which is very convenient and useful for
mobile environment users. The users can see a clear record
of charges in the TCC and identify any problems in the bill.
Furthermore, the scheme can save mobile system resources,
since most computing is done by users or service providers.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a ticket-based mobile service system for
mobile users is proposed and also implemented with SMS
system. First, the TCC issues tickets for the users. Second,
a ticket-based mechanism is implemented allowing the user
to remunerate the service providers. Tickets provide a flex-
ible and scalable mechanism for mobile access. The main
contributions of this paper are that the scheme is a global
ticket-based solution for mobile service, an anonymous and
dynamic system, and new users and new service providers
can join at anytime. It is also scalable and users can check
charges at anytime.
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